A0301
Title: Participation, transparency, and cost asymmetry in common-pool resource governance
Authors: Pathomwat Chantarasap - Chulalongkorn University (Thailand) [presenting]
Nuttaporn Rochanahastin - Prince of Songkla University (Thailand)
Abstract: The purpose is to explore the governance of common-pool resources, focusing on fisheries, where not all players/stakeholders are involved in setting usage rules. Motivated by real-world challenges in inclusive decision-making, a computer-based laboratory experiment is relied on to investigate how resource use is affected by different rule-setting scenarios. It is found that externally set resource-use rules (such as from government agencies) lead to resource usage that is closer to the social optimum than rules solely set by users. Additionally, the involvement of only a subset of players in rule setting significantly affects common resource use, particularly when cost structures differ among users. Players who are excluded from the decision-making process, especially those with lower extraction costs, tend to exploit the resource more aggressively, resulting in both overuse and increased inequality. These findings highlight the interaction between institutional exclusion and economic heterogeneity. By systematically testing these dynamics, robust empirical evidence is provided for the critical role of inclusive and transparent rule setting in promoting equitable participation and sustainable resource management.
