A1710
Title: The population lotto game: How strategic resource allocation structures non-transitive outcomes in pairwise competitions
Authors: Joel Nishimura - Arizona State University (United States) [presenting]
Giovanni Artiglio - University of Wisconsin - Madison (United States)
Abstract: To understand if and how strategic resource allocation can constrain the structure of pairwise competition outcomes in human competitions, a new multiplayer resource allocation Game, the Population Lotto Game, is introduced. This Game allows agents to allocate their resources across a continuum of possible specializations. While the Game allows non-transitive cycles between players, its Nash equilibrium forms a hierarchical structure between discrete leagues based on different resource budgets, with potential sub-league structure and/or non-transitive cycles inside individual leagues. An algorithm that can find a particular Nash equilibrium for any finite set of discrete sub-Population sizes and budgets is provided. Furthermore, the algorithm finds the unique Nash equilibrium that remains stable for the subset of players with budgets below any threshold.
