A1674
Title: A plea offer you cannot refuse
Authors: Luke Nicholas Taylor - Aarhus University (Denmark) [presenting]
Abstract: The vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are resolved through plea bargaining, yet the determinants of defendants' plea decisions remain poorly understood. Empirical analysis is complicated by selective missingness: plea offers are observed only when accepted, while trial outcomes are observed only when rejected. A structural model of plea choice extends the generalized Roy framework to allow for ex-ante uncertainty and non-risk-neutral preferences. Identification exploits quasi-random assignment of judges, which generates exogenous variation in trial conviction probabilities and sentencing outcomes. Using detailed case-level data from North Carolina, the analysis recovers defendants' expected trial utility and estimates the determinants of plea acceptance. Large plea discounts and substantial baseline aversion to trial are documented, while limited evidence of departures from risk neutrality is found. Results suggest that plea bargaining outcomes are driven less by preferences over risk and more by the structure of incentives and uncertainty embedded in the trial process.
